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NOTE AND COMMENT
in the Cloke and Lindsay cases, no great criticism could be justi-
fiably directed at a decision holding such publication to be im-
mune from injunctions.
IV.
To summarize, the following conclusions are repeated:
Peaceful picketing has been recognized as a form of speech en-
titled to the broad protection of Article II, Section 10 of the
Montana Constitution for over thirty years. The fact that such
picketing is done in connection with a secondary boycott is im-
material under present law. Even in cases where the picketing
is used to further an illegal purpose, it should be free from in-
junctions, with possible exceptions arising from situations where
the right is abused beyond all reason. These conclusions should
not be weakened by federal cases taking a narrower view of the
matter, due to differences between the pertinent provisions of
the two constitutions concerned. The Montana Court, unlike
some other tribunals, has refused to employ a double standard in
determining when free speech doctrines are to be applied. From
the beginning, it has been held that labor, as well as other seg-
ments of society, is entitled to free speech, and it is thought that
such fairness should prevail whenever the matter is tested in
this state.
DAVID WILLIAMS.
WRONGFUL DEATH OF MINOR-PROPER PARTY
PLAINTIFF
The Revised Code of Montana, 1947, Section 93-2809 (9075)
provides:
"A father, or in the case of his death or desertion of
his family, the mother, may maintain an action for the
injury or death or a minor child, and a guardian for in-
jury or death of his ward, when such injury or death is
caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another .. ."
We are here concerned with the ability of the mother to
bring suit under this section.
The Montana Supreme Court has indicated a necessity for
strict compliance with the terms of this statute in the parties it
qualifies as plaintiffs. Thus, the mother must affirmatively al-
lege the death or desertion of the father or ". . the complaint
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does not state a cause of action in favor of the mother of the
child."' Similar holdings are common to most other jurisdictions.!
In all Montana cases decided to date such application of
the statute has apparently produced conscionable results. There
has as yet been no occasion for close scrutiny of the statute in
light of the legislative policy declared in other sections of the
code. Such an occasion would arise if, at the time of the death
or injury of the minor child, the father and mother were di-
vorced, or separated with consent, and the actual custody of the
minor were in the mother. The terms of Section 93-2809 (9075)
compel suit to be brought by the father. Apparently no judicial
cognizance can be taken of the practical difficulties which may
exist. If the father is living many miles away, or is antagonistic
toward the mother, or takes no interest because he can see no
benefit for himself, the mother's remedy becomes unnecessarily
difficult and, perhaps, impossible. Being preferred by the
statute, the father can lawfully compromise the claim without
the mother's knowledge or consent. Even if he prosecutes he
may do so with such a lack of interest, or with such delay, that
the cause will be mishandled or lost and the mother left with
little or no recourse. None of these difficulties, however, alter
the effect of the statute. The father remains the only possible
plaintiff.
Another objection arises from a consideration of the meas-
ure of damages available to a father who does not have custody
of the child. Recovery is for loss of services, earnings, and con-
tributions.! As to these, has the father suffered any loss? Realis-
tically, such benefits belong to the mother.! If any recovery is
had at all it must be predicated upon this loss suffered by the
mother. Thus, one person suffers the loss; another collects the
remedy. If the father is treated as trustee for the mother there
is still the practical objection that the jury, having free discre-
tion in the amount of damages,5 may be influenced by the pres-
ence of the non-suffering father as plaintiff to the detriment of
the amount recovered for the mother. In spite of all objections,
2Martin v. City of Butte (1906) 34 Mont. 281, 81 P. 264.
Davis v. Southern Arizona Freight Lines (1939) 30 Cal. App. 2d 48,
85 P.2d 897, Benton v. Associated Indemnity Corp., (1938) 195 Wash.
446, 81 P.2d 507, Nordlund v. Lewis & C. R. Co., (1932) 141 Or. 83, 15
P.2d 980, also see 16 AM. Jun., §§262, 271 and cases cited.
'Gilman v. C. W. Dart Hardware Co. (1910) 42 Mont. 96, 111 P. 550.
Burns v. Eminger (1929) 84 Mont. 397, 276 P. 437.
'R.C.M. 1947 §36-115 (5796) is express as to separation.6R.C.M. 1947 §93-2810 (9076), Gilman v. C. W. Dart Hardware Co.
(1910) 42 Mont. 96, Ill P. 550.
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however, the language of Section 93-2809 (9075) is specific and
controlling.
The mother must show fulfillment of the statutory con-
tingencies before she can be a party to the suit. Can divorce or
separation with consent be construed as "desertion of his fami-
ly" within the meaning of the statute? Desertion denotes will-
ful abandonment of a relation in which one owes duties.! The
court in decreeing a divorce terminates the very relation with
which such desertion is concerned as between the mother and
the father, and, once terminated, there is nothing left to be will-
fully abandoned. Further, it must be remembered that the
desertion must involve the entire family, and not the wife alone.
Clearly, divorce itself, when on grounds other than desertion,'
does not constitute desertion as contemplated by the statute in
question. There must be something more than a mere cessation
of the marriage relation,' such as subsequent failure to comply
with the provisions of the decree relating to support or custody
so as to amount to abandonment of the new, divorced relation-
ship. Likewise, a separation consented to cannot be desertion
because of the element of consent.' The result is that the mother
in spite of her loss, simply cannot sue either by herself or by
joinder with the father.
The possibility of finding a declared legislative policy which
would avoid these results has not been concluded by any Mon-
tana cases, nor by any decisions in other jurisdictions having
identical statutes. In no case has the inconsistency of Section
93-2809 (9075) with other sections been asserted and thus de-
cided.' Those cases which have considered the mother's right
to sue are relevant only to show that the problem has not been
squarely met.
6Stoneburner v. Theodoratos (1934) (Cal.) 30 P.2d 1001, see also
WoRDs & PHRASES, Vol. 12, Permanent Edition.
'See Frazzini v. Cable (1931) 114 Cal. App. 444, 300 P. 121 for case
where even divorce on grounds of desertion did not give mother a
right to sue.
'Clark v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. (1902) 29 Wash. 139, 69 P. 636, 59
L.R.A. 508.
9R.C.M. 1947 §21-109 (5741) codifies this truth as related to desertion
as grounds for divorce.
'House v. Pacific Greyhound Lines (1939) 35 Cal. App. 2d, 366, 95
P.2d 465, gives casual support to contentions of this comment in dis-
cussing the case of Abos v. Martyn (1935) 10 Cal. App. 2d 698, 52 P.2d
987. The court said, "... we find justification in the laws of Oregon
for her being joined as party plaintiff. In section 33-304, Oregon Code,
it is provided that equal rights and responsibilities are given both par-
ents, not only in the custody and earnings of the children, but also as
to inheritance from an unmarried minor and an equal right of support.
Oregon Code, 27-1402."
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In some respects, the California statutory picture is not the
same as that in Montana, even though our Section 93-2809
i(9075) is, word for word, an exact duplication of California
Code Civil Procedure, Section 376. The California Supreme
Court recently pointed this out when it stated:"
"Except in certain circumstances not here present, the
father alone is authorized to bring an action for the death
of a minor child. Code Civil Procedure, Section 376. This
provision is in accord with the general rule in California
that the husband has the management and control of com-
munity property and ordinarily must bring an action con-
cerning it. Civil Code, Sections 172, 172a."'
Montana does not have a community property law,' so the
very ground relied upon for this decision is not available to Mon-
tana courts. Previous California decisions which had given a
different effect to the element of community property, and
which this case overruled on that basis, indicated an inclination
to allow the mother to join as plaintiff,' suggesting perhaps that
except for this one difference the California rulings would tend
to support the thesis of this comment.
Divorce dissolves the community and the property is divided
by the court' so that after divorce the factor preventing Cali
fornia decisions from exercising controlling effect in Montana
is no longer in existence. Therefore, as to those cases involving
divorce, California rulings have been made in the same statutory
atmosphere that prevails in Montana, but none have directly
posed and decided the issue here involved.' The same is true
of other jurisdictions." Thus, the question remains an open
one.
It is settled in Montana that a cause of action in the parents
for the death of a minor child did not exist at the common law,
but is purely statutory." Even though a new right is thereby
"Fuentes v. Tucker (1947) 31 Cal. App. 2d 1, 187 P.2d 752.
"Tfhis comment is not extended to a consideration of whether the in-
consistency might not still exist even in the presence of California
community property law.
"R.C.M. 1947 §36-104 (5785).
"House v. Pacific Greyhound Lines (1939) 35 Cal. App. 2d 366, 95 P.2d
465; Keena v. United Railroads of S. F. (1922) 57 Cal. App. 124, 207
P. 34; Abos v. Martyn (1935) 10 Cal. App. 2d 698, 52 P.2d 987.
"California Civil Code (1937) §§146, 147.
"Frazzini v. Cable (1931) 114 Cal. App. 444, 300 P. 121; Espinosa v.
Haslam (1935) 8 Cal. App. 2d 213, 47 P.2d 479.
"American R. Co. of Puerto Rico v. Santiago, (1926) 9 F.2d 753; Clark
v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. (1902) 29 Wash. 139, 69 P. 636, 59 L.R.A. 508,
"Melzner v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. (1912) 46 Mont. 162, 127 P. 147;
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created, a liberal interpretation is to be given the statute to ef-
fect its object ". . . and to promote justice.' '
The object of the legislation, patterned after Lord Camp-
bell's Act of 1846, was to correct a shortcoming of the common
law by providing a remedy wherever a loss had been suffered
through the wrongful death of a minor. The obvious injustice
of allowing recompense for injury and denying it for death
prompted many strongly worded discussions,' so that an enact-
ment of some sort has been passed in every United States juris-
diction, with the purpose of ending the discussion and establish-
ing the law. In view of this, it would not appear inconsistent
with the object of the statute and the promotion of justice, as
stated by R.C.M. 1947 Section 12-202 (4), to attempt a con-
struction of Section 93-2809 (9075) which grants the remedy
to the party who has suffered the wrong.
The guideposts for our construction are found in the code.
The Revised Code of Montana, 1947, Section 61-105 (5834)
states:
"The father and mother of a legitimate unmarried
minor child are equally entitled to its custody, services
and earnings. If either party be dead, or unable, or re-
fuse to take the custody, or has abandoned his or her
family, the other is entitled to its custody, services and
earnings. "
This section shows that at the outset, regardless of the
marital standing of the parties, each has an equal right to the
custody, services and earnings.' But these rights are not ab-
solute,' and either or both parties may be deprived of their
rights in accord with certain statutory methods, aside from
those included in the section itself,' such as exercise of judicial
Batchoff v. Butte Pacific Copper Co. (1921) 60 Mont. 179, 198 P. 132;
Maronen v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co. (1913) 48 Mont. 249, 136 P.
968.
'R.C.M. 1947 §12-202 (4) : "The rule of the common law that statutes
in derogation thereof are to be strictly construed has no application to
the code or other statutes of the state of Montana. The codes estab-
lish the law of this state respecting the subjects to which they relate
and their provisions and all proceedings under them are to be liberally
construed with a view to effect their objects and to promote justice."
P°PRossER ON TORTS p. 955, notes 91, 92 and 93.
2'This equality is emphasized further by R.C.M. 1947 §61-106 (5835):
"The husband and father, as such, has no rights superior to those of
the wife and mother, in regard to the care, custody, education, and
control of the children of the marriage, while such husband and wife
live separate and apart from each other."
Ex parte Bourquin (1930) 88 Mont. 118, 290 P. 250.
'Ex parte Reinhardt (1930) 88 Mont. 282, 292 P. 582.
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discretion under Section 21-138 (5770) relating to custody in
divorce," or by coming within the coverage of a section such
as R.C.M. 1947, 36-115 (5796) which provides:
"The earnings and accumulations of the wife, and of
her minor children, living with her or in her custody,
while she is living separate from her husband, are the
separate property of the wife."
This section deprives the father of any right to the earn-
ings of his child in a special set of circumstances. The same
result has been reached in divorce cases without the aid of a
specific statute, and even though a parent has no control over
the child's property," as is the case in Montana."
Thus it is quite apparent that the property rights of the
father under the substantive law provisions of the code are not
as absolute as his right to sue under the procedure afforded in
Section 93-2809 (9075). There are situations in which the
mother and not the father is the owner of the rights which the
statute is designed to protect. Realizing this, and granting
further that the mother, even in marriage, is entitled to bring
suit in the protection of her property or enforcement of any
legal or equitable right,' the inconsistency of Section 93-2809
(9075) in restricting her rights as a plaintiff becomes apparent.
The father has the right to sue and nothing to protect; the
mother has the rights to protect and no power to sue."
There is no necessity for allowing the mother to be a plain-
tiff when, as in most cases, the marriage is a normally happy
one, in spite of the fact that even then her rights to custody,
services and earnings of the children are no less than those of
the father. As was once pointed out," an obvious purpose be-
hind the particularity of the statute in qualifying plainiffs, is
whether originally intended so or not, to avoid multiplicity
of suits and assure a finality of the litigation. No contention is
made, in light of this observation, that the terms of the statute
ought to be so liberalized either in language or construction as
24Haynes v. Fillner (1937) 106 Mont. 59, 75 P.2d 802.
'Watkins v. Clemmer (1933) 19 P.2d 303, 129 Cal. App. 567.
"R.C.M. 1947 §61-110 (5839).
"R.C.M. 1947 §36-110 (5791). This statute does not exist in California.
"Another example: The terms of R.C.M. 1947 §61-105 (5834) give the
mother a whole right to custody, services and earnings if the father
is "unable, or refuses to take the custody. . ." yet R.C.M. 1947 §93-2809(9075) in this situation denies her the right to sue for such services
and earnings.
2"House v. Pacific Greyhound Lines (1939) 35 Cal App. 2d 366, 95 P.2d
465.
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to allow either the mother or father to sue in equal right under
all circumstances. It is only when the happy unity of the mar-
riage is broken that the rights of the mother demand formal
recognition.
Our statute is a product of the common law rule denying
the mother any legal right to the services and earnings of her
legitimate child so long as the father is alive and not guilty of
abandonment. But, as already pointed out, that common law
basis no longer exists, and lacking the reason for the restriction,
the restriction itself should disappear.
An analysis of the cases shows, and the other code sections
would support, a natural disposition upon the part of the courts
to observe rather closely the element of actual custody of the
child. Where the custody lies, so has followed the right to sue
in every case where to do so was not a direct violation of the
terms of the statute.
In Frazzini v. Cable ' the mother secured a divorce on
grounds of desertion. Custody of the children was granted to
her. The father, with the mother's permission, secured actual
custody of the child and upon the child's death the court upheld
the father's right to sue on the ground that the time of death
was the controlling time and that then the father was not in
desertion of his family. The right to sue followed the actual
custody.
In the case of Espinosa v. Haslam' the father was convicted
of assault and battery against his wife, who then left him. For
fifteen years he maintained and educated the children. The de-
ceased, a boy of eighteen years, left the father and moved in
with the mother because the father objected to his nocturnal
wanderings. The mother, after the boy's death a year later,
filed suit and collected a $1500 settlement. Five months later
the father sued and the mother's settlement was pleaded in bar.
The court was faced with a perplexing problem. If it found a
right of suit in the mother and none in the father, the latter
would be without remedy though he had supported the child for
fifteen years, the mother profiting at the father's expense. If,
on the other hand, the father was the proper plaintiff, the de-
fendant would be subjected to double damages. The court satis-
fied both objections by upholding the father's right to sue, but
found such a lack of damages that suit was dismissed. This left
the father in a position to proceed against the mother if he so
desired, and protected the defendant from having to pay twice.
1(1931) 114 Cal. App. 444, 300 P. 121.
8(1935) 8 Cal. App. 2d 213, 47 P.2d 479.
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The decision does not say that actual custody is not an impor-
tant consideration, even though the right to sue was not given
to the spouse having actual custody at the time of the death.
Custody was the controlling factor in finding a lack of abandon-
ment on the part of the father and was therefore the key to the
decision.
In another case,' where the mother had secured a divorce
and legal custody, but left the children with the father, never to
return and take actual custody, there is little wonder that the
court denied suit by the mother.
The same principle produced opposite results in the case of
Clark v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co.' where it was held the mother
was a proper plaintiff when the divorced husband, who was
given legal custody of the child, left the child with the mother
promising to pay $10 per month, but neither paid nor returned.
It is admitted that in all of these cases the terms of the
statute and not the element of actual custody, were controlling
in the results reached. The contention of this comment is that
the element of actual custody was, however, the most important
factor in determining the applicability of the terms of the
statute. For that reason, the suggestion is made that the con-
struction placed upon the statute be made more consistent with
the realistic element of actual custody, or the terms of the code
section be amended for that purpose. A survey of all cases in
which Section 93-2809 (9075) is concerned will support this
comment by showing that a rule based upon the actual custody
principle would not have been violated by the results reached.
The terms of Section 93-2809 (9075) were drafted to bring
justice out of common law complacency at a time when the rights
of married women were more stringently restricted. The changed
legal status of women in our present day4 gives birth to possi-
bilities which were not within any possible legislative contempla-
tion at the time the statute was originally adopted. As a result,
the circumstances of a divorced or separated mother as herein
described make a just solution impossible under this section; an
end directly contrary to the purpose for which it was adopted.
Only keeping the terms or interpretation of the statute in pace
with other and more modern statutory advances can satisfy the
motive which prompted the enactment of Section 93-2809 (9075).
CHARLES LUEDKE
'American R. Co. of Puerto Rico v. Santiago (1926) 9 F.2d 753.
0(1902) 29 Wash. 139, 69 P. 636, 59 L.R.A. 508.
'The relevant sections are contained in Titles 36 and 61, R.C.M. 1947,
and were enacted subsequent to §93-2809 (9075).
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